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FULL COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

OF

H.R. 752

TO AMEND TITLE 38, UNITED STATES CODE, TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED BY CHAPTER 30 OF THAT TITLE

AND

H.J. RES. 180

TO APPROVE THE OBLIGATION OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE BY PUBLIC LAW 98-473 FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF MX MISSILES, SUBJECT TO THE ENACTMENT OF A SECOND JOINT RESOLUTION

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 20, 1985

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MARKUP OF H.R. 752 AND H.J. RES. 180

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 20, 1985.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

We have a couple of items to deal with this afternoon, the first of which is a bill out of the Personnel Subcommittee. The principal author is Mr. Montgomery.

The second issue we want to vote on is the issue of unfencing the money for the 21 MX missiles.

Mr. Montgomery, Sonny.

[H.R. 752 is as follows:]

99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 752

To amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure an orderly transition to the new educational assistance program established by chapter 30 of that title.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 28, 1985

Mr. MONTGOMERY (for himself, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, and Mr. SOLOMON) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs and Armed Services

---

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure an orderly transition to the new educational assistance program established by chapter 30 of that title.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985".

ELIGIBILITY AMENDMENTS

SEC. 2. (a) Section 1411(a)(1)(A) of title 38, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding clause (i)—

(A) by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985"; and

(B) by striking out "first" both places it appears; and

(2) in clauses (i) and (ii), by inserting "after such date of enactment" after "who" the first place it appears in each clause.

(b) Section 1412(a)(1)(A) of such title is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding clause (i)—

(A) by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985"; and

(B) by striking out "first" both places it appears; and

(2) in clause (i), by inserting ", after such date of enactment," after "serves".

CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

SEC. 3. (a) Section 1411(c)(1) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking out "initially enters" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "enters, after the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985,".

(b) Section 1412(d)(1) of such title is amended by striking out "initially enters" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "enters, after the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985,".

(c) Section 1413 of such title is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting "after the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985" before the period at the end; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by inserting in clause (1) "after the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985" after "individual"; and

(B) by inserting in clause (2) "after such date of enactment" after "individual" the first place it appears.

(d) Section 1416 of such title is amended by striking out "June 30, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985,".

(e) Section 704 of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 1984 is amended—

(1) by inserting "(a)" after "704."; and

(2) by adding the following new subsection at the end:

"(b) No individual who becomes a member of the Armed Forces or enters on active duty as a member of the Armed Forces on or after the date of the enactment of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Eligibility Amendments of 1985 may enroll in the educational assistance program described in subsection (a) before July 1, 1988.".

○

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This amendment was voted out of the subcommittee by a nine to zero vote—no "no" votes against it.

I would like at this time to ask unanimous consent that the 3-day layover rule be waived to permit full committee consideration of the bill today, even though it was reported out of the subcommittee only yesterday. This bill will be up on the suspension calendar Monday.

Leadership from both sides would like to get some legislation on the calendar for Monday and Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any question?

This is a bill we are bringing up under expedited procedure here. I want everybody to pay attention to what the bill is all about.

Sonny, why don't you take some time to explain it.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. This request came from the Defense Department. The new GI education bill will be effective July 1, 1985. This amendment was added by the Senate to the GI bill we passed out of this committee. So Dr. Korb and the Department have asked that we move back the effective date from July 1 to the date of enactment of the bill before us today, H.R. 752, which means it would go into effect about April 15 or May 1. The idea is that some young men and women might hold back until July 1 and then all come in at that time, flooding the recruiting centers and the schools. It just makes common sense, and there is no cost to going ahead and moving the date back.

It does one other thing, Mr. Chairman. It provides benefits to those with prior service—a very small number of these people who get out of the service, then want to get back in. Right now, they are not eligible for the GI education bill. It would say prior service would be eligible. These are people we want back in the service. It might be an incentive to get them into the service.

That is what it does. It backdates the effective date for not only the active forces but for the reserve forces, and makes prior service people eligible.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions about the legislation?

Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. I have no questions. I understand the import of what we are doing. The simple backdating presents no problem to me. I understand the reason for it.

I would like to go on record again as saying that I opposed reinstitution of the bill; I was one of the few who voted against it. There is no justification for it, no need for it. We have a backlog of people trying to get into the service now. There is no need for added inducement.

At a time when we are trying to balance the budget, this is just another additional expense. However, the Congress has acted on it; it is done. This is simply changing the act, the effective date. I certainly would have no objection to that.

For that reason, I didn't make any objection to the unanimous consent request. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. I have one question of the gentleman from Mississippi.

As you know, we have a problem with those individuals who want to get out before December 31, 1989, because that is the date that the present GI bill cuts off. I understood—I talked with staff for a while yesterday, and I understood that those people will receive—who are already in the service but who would get out after that date—will receive one-half the benefits of the new GI bill.

Is that accurate?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is correct. They will receive benefits under the new GI bill plus one-half of their Vietnam-era entitlement. There is one point we would like to make.

The services were quite concerned that the Vietnam GI bill will expire in 1989. About 40 percent of the active forces were going to be allowed to take their educational benefits. That would mean we would have to take in new people and train them. You voted—everyone except Mr. Dickinson and one other—which the military services wanted—to extend the act for another 10 years. Not only is it better than the Vietnam-era bill, it is half that much better, 1½ times what the GI bill was in Vietnam. So it does extend it. They are protected.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there other questions or comments?

If not, we will have a vote.

All in favor say aye.

Opposed?

The motion is unanimously carried—do you want a record vote, Sonny, or is it all right?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. No; when you win, let it go.

The CHAIRMAN. The next issue is the issue of the MX missiles.

Mr. Stratton.

[H.J. Res. 180 is as follows:]

99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. 180

To approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 5, 1985

Mrs. HOLT (for herself and Mrs. BYRON) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

To approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That subject to the enactment (after the enactment of this joint resolution) of a joint resolution further approving the obligation of such funds, the Congress approves the obligation of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles (in addition to the funds previously authorized to be obligated).

○

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee approve House Joint Resolution 180 as well as the second required joint resolution referred to the Committee on Appropriations. The effect of adopting the resolutions is to make available for obligation $1.5 billion previously approved for fiscal year 1985, subject to the subsequent adoption of two joint resolutions.

This amount, Mr. Chairman, will permit the procurement of 21 additional operational MX missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a second?

Mr. WHITEHURST. Second.

The CHAIRMAN. Second from Mr. Whitehurst.

I would point out to the members that the policy panel voted favorably on this issue this morning—nine votes for, one against, one vote present.

Is there a debate on the issue?

The gentleman from Florida is recognized.

Mr. BENNETT. I would like to speak in opposition to it. I think it is probably the biggest and most important issue we have before us. It is tied to the overall national strength of our country.

At the present time, we have been advised by General Rogers, head of our NATO forces, that we can't hold back a conventional war more than a very few days, in Europe. We would have to use nuclear weaponry. That seems to me to be an absurd situation for a powerful country like ours to be in. I think it is the worst thing that could be said about our country today.

I think the next worst thing is the budget. I think it is the most preeminent worry that I have about our country.

If we turn back this proposal made by Mr. Stratton for this expenditure, we would not be only turning down the money in this particular bill but we would also be turning down, as I see it, the future of this weapon, which is $13 billion of new money for the weapons themselves, missiles; and an indefinite amount of money for the hardening, but estimated anywhere from $30 billion to $50 billion for the hardening, if it can be hardened.

So we have a situation where you have got at least $40 billion—probably at least $43 billion—which rides on this vote. That $43 billion could buy us a lot of conventional strength in Europe and make it unnecessary for us to have a nuclear war. I think that makes sense.

If you want to look at it another way, this Congress is probably going to turn down the President's request for additional funding of weaponry and ships and other things of that nature. Probably a 3 percent increase over inflation is about all we can get, if we can get that. If we do cut it that deeply—of course, I won't be in favor of cutting it down that deeply—but if Congress as a whole cuts it down that deeply, then we are going to lose a lot of things like tanks, ships, airplanes, many other things which should be done for the national strength of our country.

So I think a vote against the MX would be a vote for sanity in 1985. It will save us a lot of money which can be put into our conventional strength so we will have a chance to not have a nuclear war, so we won't have our country riding on our lack of strength of

conventional weaponry in Europe. And we would also be able to take a dig at the budget deficit by seeing this money goes for worthwhile weaponry instead of weaponry which is so redundant and so vulnerable and so unattractive to the leaders of our country from the standpoint of the military observations.

Weinberger says don't build it; it is too vulnerable. He says now he can make it stronger, but he didn't put a penny in here for strengthening the tubes. Nobody testified the tubes could be made that strong.

We have a situation where most of the military authorities have objected to this way of going, have only turned their mind because of the Scowcroft agreement. I sat in on that. I heard the vitals of that. I sat with those men, former Secretaries of Defense, and heard not a single man say he favored the MX; not a single man said he favored the arms control.

That is all there was to the agreement. It was an agreement to get the MX at any cost. They tied it together with some ridiculous arms control arrangement and brought something out that could get the MX. But nobody spoke for the MX; nobody said it was a good weapon. They just said we can get the MX by having the arms control language in there.

We have the language now. We said on the floor of the House—at least leadership for the MX last year said on the floor that we would be able to get the people to the bargaining table, in which event we wouldn't ask for this money or it would be the other way. So now we do have them at the table.

So why are we worried about it? Everybody knows they didn't go to the table because of the MX; they went there because of SDI.

I listened to people come back—Members come back—trip after trip to Europe. Not a one has ever said anything about the Europeans are worried about the MX. They are very disappointed in the fact that nobody raises MX. Why? Well, the top officials of Russia have said repeatedly, "It is of no value. We are glad for you to spend $40 billion on that weapon. That is a good way to throw your money away."

There is no bargaining chip involved on either side. The President says it is not a bargaining chip; they say it is not. If all it does is strengthen—if it does that—it may strengthen to a very limited degree the posture of the United States. Isn't the posture of the United States involved a little bit in intelligence? Isn't it intelligent to be able to win a conventional war in Europe? Isn't that a more intelligent way to go, to see to it you don't have a nuclear war?

I am making a plea not just to put out the money for the MX but to spend the money for a conventional war in Europe so we will not have to have a nuclear war, because that is our plan at the present time.

A matter of days, if we have to go to nuclear war—that is what the authorities say. That is an astounding situation for our country to be in.

End of comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from Maryland.

Mrs. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think to unfence this weapon system at this time is a step that we can't afford not to take. We must take it. I feel it is more than simply going ahead with the modernization of our land-based missiles that the President proposed when he first went into office. That decision was confirmed by the voters of the country. It proves that we have the resolve, the will in this Nation to go forward with a strong position of national security.

I have just had the opportunity to return from Geneva after a meeting with our negotiators there. I was firmly convinced by some very, very capable people—Ambassador Kampelman, Ambassador Glitman—who feel very strongly that we should continue our modernization of our triad. This is certainly an integral part of it.

I think it would be devastating at this point if we didn't go forward with unfencing this weapons system. We have all heard the story that Senator Specter heard yesterday from Mr. Warnke about the B-1 bomber. I also had the opportunity to be in the Soviet Union shortly after that and met with Marshall Ogarkov. I heard him say to one of our Members who asked him, "We have abandoned the B-1 bomber; what do you plan to do in return?"—he laughed. It was the only time I saw him laugh. He laughed and said nobody asked us to give up anything for that weapon system.

So I think that is the attitude. I feel very strongly this is a step we absolutely have to take at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mavroules first.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I know this is a very difficult afternoon for all of us. I think we have heard testimony on both ends of the scale, pro and con. Our own committee today voted. Although I was very disappointed, I was not surprised that I was the only one to vote in opposition to the motion put forth in our own policy panel.

One thing: We have to keep a couple of things in mind and get this back in perspective where it belongs, along with newspaper reporting, along with what people say in newspapers, and everything we want to read into it. We want to remember in 1977 when President Carter canceled the B-1 bomber. Even by canceling the B-1 bomber, he was able to achieve, after 7 years, an agreement on the SALT II agreement.

So the argument that you need a particular weapon system to reach agreement on arms control just doesn't hold water. It doesn't work. We no longer have been discussing here the merit of the weapon system alone. What we have been doing now, we have taken statements made by the President and members of the administration, especially the President, when he stated that, not to give him the MX missile or if we take the MX missile away from him, it would cut the legs from our negotiators in Geneva.

That statement is incorrect, absolutely incorrect, because every single witness that we had before our policy panel was asked the very same question—if that statement were true. Not one—not one, including Secretary Weinberger, Ambassador Nitze, people whom I have a deep respect for—stated that that one particular weapon system would cut the legs out from our negotiators.

In fairness, they did say, however, they wanted the MX missile system as part of a balanced weapons system and deterrent.

I have got to be fair in my evaluation and analysis. As sure as we are sitting here today, the same argument we have been hearing for the last 3 or 4 years, we will be back in next year being forced to the table, stating that if you don't give me the MX missile, arms control negotiations will not be successful. It will happen in 1986 and 1987 and 1988. It will continue so long as people want to take the word of those people who are now in office.

I have a deep respect for the President. I always have. And I have spoken up in his behalf back home on many occasions. But the point is, in this particular item, in my judgment the President is wrong, dead wrong.

And, you know, then we hear perception: What are the people saying out there? Maybe I can say this to my colleagues on the Democratic side; that maybe the Democrats have a perception of being weak on defense. Well, that is another misnomer. Because under this administration, over 5 years when you take the last year adjusted of Jimmy Carter, the President asked for over $1.273 trillion in defense spending. And on a bipartisan effort, he was given $1.170 trillion. He received 95 percent of all that he has asked for on a bipartisan effort, on the parts of Republicans and Democrats alike.

So to those of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, I ask you to look at that very closely. We have been supportive. Certainly, we cannot be branded as being weak on defense. We try to be responsible.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Parliamentary inquiry.

This gentleman would like to know under what rules the Chair is operating. It seems the Chair is arbitrarily deciding who will speak. I respect the Chair, but more respect the integrity of the process that allows each of us to speak at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will be able to speak, for sure. We are not going to vote on this thing until everybody has had their say. I was trying to alternate between proponents and opponents for as long as I could.

Mr. DELLUMS. You jumped over some opponents.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is a principal opponent—not to denigrate the gentleman from California. The gentleman from California will have his chance, if I get a chance——

Mr. DELLUMS. Further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

What ranks as a major proponent? This gentleman is the first gentleman to oppose the MX missile. This gentleman still demands to understand the nature of the process by which the Chair is arbitrarily deciding to recognize members of this body.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is recognizing people in the order in which they asked to be recognized—opponents and then proponents. The gentleman from Massachusetts raised his hand before the gentleman from California. I have just elevated the gentleman from California to a major opponent, and he will have a chance to talk.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to make a couple of very brief comments. I think it is quite clear that over the last year and a half we have been hear-

ing, within the confines of the Congress and within the confines of this committee, a complaint that we are not negotiating with the Soviet Union to a very large extent. That was because the Soviet Union walked out of the talks. Therefore, we were unable to make any negotiations.

The Soviets have come back in now. Regardless of exactly what it was that brought them back, they have come back. We have undertaken negotiations.

The head of the President's negotiating team is an outstanding Democrat, so it is not a political arrangement. And it seems to me strange that those people who have been urging us to undertake negotiations are refusing to listen to the negotiators at the negotiating table who have testified here in the presence of our senior negotiator, Mr. Nitze; that any effort to eliminate the MX is going to pull out the rug from those negotiators.

I can't understand how anybody who really believes in arms negotiation would want to do anything that would jeopardize the success of the negotiations going on in Geneva. When our negotiators tell us that this will hurt their position, it seems to me that this committee can do nothing better than to vote for this motion that I have made.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The point of order was not a frivolous one. I don't believe that the Chair of any committee has any elite privileges. I believe that within the context of representative government, the Chair must adhere to the process that has been established that acts as the rules to govern, the rules of the committee.

I am not challenging the gentleman personally, but simply challenging the practice that allows the gentleman to decide who may or may not speak at a particular moment. I want to assert my concern in that respect as powerfully as I can.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, there are no surprises on this committee. The only new information that we will receive is where the new members of this committee shall vote. But those of us who have been on this committee for a number of years all know how we shall vote.

This gentleman shall not burden the committee with a long and detailed analysis of why this gentleman opposes the MX missile, but in summary fashion to just say we have opposed this weapon during the 1970's, we opposed the weapon in the fiscal year 1985 budget, and will continue as articulately and as aggressively as we can oppose this weapon system on the ground that it is expensive, it is unnecessary, it is dangerous, it is not a bargaining chip.

It is a flawed weapon system. It does not in any way address the issue of vulnerability, which, I might remind my colleagues, was the initial impetus for the development of this weapon.

Finally, both the Soviet Union and the United States have an enormous number of reasons to maintain their presence at the table to negotiate us back from the brink of thermal nuclear war, far beyond whether we vote up or down on the MX missile, and that is the preservation of human life on this planet.

So, Mr. Chairman, those are my comments to continue my active opposition to this weapon system. And I thank the gentleman for

his courtesy in elevating this gentleman to a major opponent of the MX missile.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a major proponent on this side?

Mr. Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just in response to some of the statements that went before to the effect that many arms negotiators, if not most arms negotiators, and experts, have told us that we shouldn't go with MX, we concluded our panel hearings this morning with the policy panel, and in my estimation the great weight of testimony, including that of Mr. Nitze and other experts, and the Soviet, Mr. Gromyko's former deputy, Arkady Shevchenko, was to the effect that we should build the MX missile. Although, Shevchenko did say in response to Mr. Mavroules' question that it wouldn't make or break the arms talks if we did not go forward with MX. He said, in his opinion, it would be a mistake for the U.S. Congress to unilaterally give up the MX.

Let me just say that, in my estimation, the Soviets think that one of the great weaknesses of the United States and our allies is our inability to arrive at a consensus with regard to strategic weapons prior to arms talks. I think it would be a mistake. I don't think you can separate MX from Geneva. I think it would be a real mistake to send them a signal that, in fact, we will have that inability to arrive at consensus.

It is interesting to me that there has been very little criticism directed at the missile itself. I don't think anyone has challenged the accuracy of the missile; in fact, it is more accurate than Minuteman—the fact it carries a greater payload, the fact it is more reliable. All the controversy has surrounded essentially the basing system.

Let me just say that what you are really saying is that any basing system that involves fixed silo heavy missiles is considered by some parties to be obsolete. They are really saying that the Minutemen right now don't form a deterrent to the Soviet Union.

I would simply answer that in the context of our triad, together with our bombers and with our submarines, our missile system, our ICBM system does comprise a very formidable deterrent to the Soviet Union.

I haven't heard any arguments to the effect that we ought to dismantle the Minutemen that are in place. I think we could have passed this thing very easily if we would have simply called it Minuteman IV and hadn't gotten into the basic controversy. So I would urge an aye vote on the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Colorado.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am not sure whether I am a major or minor proponent or opponent, but I must say I was disappointed that I was not on the Policy Panel because I really feel the MX missile has to be judged on whether or not it is a weapon system, whether or not it does what it was set out to do, and whether or not we should proceed on that basis.

It seems to me we should be looking at the American interest in this, and that should be our main concern. Let me just focus on that a minute.

The whole reason we got into this was not that the Minuteman III as a missile was not working, but that the hole that we put the Minuteman III in was vulnerable because it did not move, because the Soviets have satellites in the sky, taking pictures of those satellites, and their targeting was getting better so that they could hit those holes, and people were afraid that they would be able to do a first strike. So we proceeded to try and find a way to make a mobile missile and find some way that they would then be safe; that they would no longer be vulnerable.

Now, where are we today? We have spent megabucks and gigabucks, and we are going to spend megabucks and gigabucks more. And what are we doing? Instead of putting 3 warheads in a hole, we are now going to put 10 warheads in a hole.

Now, I remind you, it is the same vulnerable hole. We went through umpte-umpt different basing modes trying to figure out how to make the MX mobile. We couldn't, because we built the missile before we built the basing mode. We built a huge, gigantic missile. It is like building the roof of this building before we built the building. We couldn't find a way to make it mobile because it was so big.

As a consequence, we have not gained one thing on the whole reason that we said we were going to build this missile, which was its vulnerability, because of the stable hole. And I assume since we are going into arms talks, we are going to keep the limits of warheads on both sides intact. It would be stupid to go into arms talks negotiations and say that, because of the MX, we now have to lift the number of warheads on both sides.

Therefore, if you keep those limits on both sides and you are a Russian planner, and someone tells you the United States is going to spend megabucks and gigabucks to put 10 warheads in a hole that they now have 3, but stay under the whole area of the limits, you would be very happy.

Is that what we did? Did we promise the Soviets if they would come to the table, we would do something this stupid? I think that is the whole problem.

We cannot defend this as a weapon system. It doesn't meet what we said we were going to do, so we have to say something else. So we said bargaining chip. I think to say we have to build this thing to go to the table is like saying we have to open 14 more boxes of caramels and chocolate bars and eat them before we go on a diet.

It is the same old thing—build fast, do everything you can. Except that in this case it doesn't even get us where we want to be. We are in the same vulnerable holes, and the only way we can ever use this thing is to use it first.

So I think it is very important to say that in the days of deficit spending this is probably the dumbest thing that we can possibly buy. I don't think it gains us any credibility under our own standards as to why we said we need it. And to try and push it off as a bargaining chip I think is just a way of ducking the real military value as to how we should judge any weapon system we spend people's money on.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Just a couple of words on the vulnerability issue. I know we are all going to have the opportunity to debate this on Monday and Tuesday. I am sure we will all be there. But I think it is rather ironic that a lot of people who argue you should not have MX because it is vulnerable are the same ones who argued a few years ago that they did not want to make it invulnerable by putting it in a mobile mode. Since they have won that issue, they are saying it is vulnerable because it is in a fixed silo. Because of their advocacy of not having it mobile a few years ago, it is a fixed silo.

The Scowcroft Commission report, I think, answered the question well. Different legs of the triad have different properties; all can't be precisely the same. Some legs are more secure than others. There is a synergistic effect; therefore, the MX, in conjunction with other legs of the triad, are sufficient with regard to the issue of vulnerability.

Also, there is the possibility of hardening in the future. That technology has improved, is improving every day.

Finally, we can certainly some day in the near future think in terms of defending by active defenses an MX missile or Minuteman III or any other land-based leg of the triad.

I think also it is important to recognize the fact that the American public, I think, has the feeling that if we build an MX, the Soviet Union will respond and build an MX themselves. The point of fact is that the Soviet Union has in the past 10 years constructed almost 800 missiles that have hard-target-kill capabilities, MX-style missiles, and we in fact are responding to them.

It also should be underlined, the fact that this whole process is really a strange one. We have debated MX year after year. We had this particular vote that we will have this coming Tuesday last year. We are voting twice in the House, twice in the Senate.

I guess it reminds me of a statement that I have said before: If you like laws and sausage, don't watch either of them being made. There comes a time when you should make a decision in America. There comes a time when you have spent $12 billion for a weapon system, and when you think in terms of not utilizing it, it is absolutely foolish.

Finally, I would like to mention the fact that the witnesses that I heard in a couple of the subcommittees of this full committee, there was a number of them that did say they could not make a judgment that the arms negotiations would not have a chance without the missile. But every—I think every single one of them, or just about every single one of them, did indicate that it would strengthen the hands of the negotiators if indeed we did vote yes on this releasing of the fencing tomorrow, and the Senate as they did yesterday.

It makes no rational sense whatsoever to send American negotiators to sit down at the big bargaining table in Geneva and, at the same time, and during the first few weeks of their negotiations, have them throw away unilaterally some of the best bargaining chips that we have. That makes no sense whatsoever.

It seems to me that when I play poker, as I do from time to time, you don't sit down and pick up your blue chips and throw them away and then start negotiating with your opponent. It makes no

rational sense whatsoever. And, obviously, from that statement you can tell I urge a yes vote with regard to the resolution.

I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hertel.

Mr. HERTEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me make it clear to the members of the committee we are not playing poker in this case. We are the authorizing committee. We, as individual legislators, have the power and responsibility of appropriations and must make the decision.

Yes; we can take advice certainly from the President of the United States, who has met with this committee; certainly, testimony from the negotiators and advice from them. But it is clear to me that we make the decision.

We are talking about the vulnerability issue so much because it was Secretary Weinberger himself who said the MX and Minuteman silo just 2 years ago would be totally vulnerable. Testimony last year showed that unless the MX was used as a first strike weapon, its vulnerability, survivability would be as low as 1 percent.

Now we talk about hardening. First of all, they don't have the technology complete. They haven't given us a final figure, but we have from Under Secretary Wade this last week testimony that they would not finance hardening the silos until 1990.

We also know in that very same hearing that we can have our own mobile missile ready in the field in the early 1990's before the MX is hardened in the silos. Clearly, it would be more survivable to have a mobile missile, which is why we read in the Washington Post, March 17, just this Sunday, the Soviet Union is moving to deploy two—two new different mobile missiles. Why? Because they are more effective, more survivable. And we are going to stick the MX in a hole in the ground.

When Congress voted for the MX before, when this committee authorized the MX before in past years, there were no talks going on. When the MX was fenced by this Congress, the Soviets came back to the table.

I think, as others have said today, that is not the major point, not the MX missile. Rather, I think it is because our NATO allies have stuck with us because we are going to be deploying the cruise and Pershing missiles, and that is what they are afraid of. I think they also fear what might come about under the SDI. Mark my words, once these missiles are unfenced, the appropriations will continue to be made so the talks can continue, so that we can show resolve. And we will be talking, with the hardening process, $40 billion to $50 billion. And that money will be taken from the Mobile Missile Program so that that Mobile Missile Program will be stretched out, won't be in effect, if at all, until the end of the century.

That is the weapon that can have greater deterrence, and that is the weapon where we have clear technology, and that is the weapon that would be survivable—mobile missile.

In the long Senate committee debate yesterday, and after when the Senators told why they changed their votes, there was not one factual argument as to an improvement in the situation of the MX over last year's vote.

I hear the word over and over—resolve. Let me say to the committee: An accelerated mobile missile in the field before the hardened silos for the MX would show resolve; it would show deterrence; it would show common sense.

I ask you to vote "no."

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether we are doing major or minor proponents or opponents, but as one who cosponsored the resolution I would suggest that I might be a major proponent.

Let me say that 2 years ago, along with Congressman Mavroules, we cosponsored an amendment on the floor, which lost by two votes, to eliminate funds for the production of the nine initial missiles. I sponsored that at that time because I had great concern about the basing modes. We had no basing modes at that time. It seemed to me ludicrous to procure and produce missiles when you had no basing mode.

That has been resolved. It hasn't been resolved in the way many people feel it should be resolved, but it was resolved at the outgrowth of the Scowcroft Commission and their recommendations.

Once that resolution was taken care of, you have to look at the options. It seems to me at this time we have no other alternatives or no other options for a modernization of a missile system. At the same time, we have time and again seen where the Soviets have taken their missiles and modernized. We have talked about our NATO alliance; we have talked about the modernization with the cruise missile and Pershing missile. We have talked about the strength of our NATO alliance.

I think when you look at this critical issue—we have talked about the Geneva talks that have just once again begun—but I think when you look at this critical issue and the options we have, in my estimation I see no other option except to vote in favor of unfencing the funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think we have pretty much addressed the question of vulnerability; so many of the strategic questions. I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a mistake at this point—after the Belgians have had the courage to go forward and live up to their agreement under deployment in Europe, to me it would be, without a question, a lack of resolve for us now to decide to back away from something that we have committed to, in my judgment, as a Congress, at least since I have served in this body. So at this point, I think that would clearly be a mistake in light of the courage that has been shown by the people in Europe.

But let me address just for a second one point that I don't think has been addressed adequately in the debate over MX. I heard a speaker earlier talk about the billions and jillions—I guess was the term that was used—that we spend on these systems. "Gigabucks," was it? OK.

I am as concerned as anybody, Mr. Chairman, about the amount of money we are putting into that defense budget. In fact, Mr. Courter and I have spent a significant amount of time trying to figure out how we could put a budget together that will be less

than what the President wants, and yet to still secure the modernization program that the President laid out 4 years ago.

And I want to point out that in the strategic area—and I have a number of constituents that say, you know, if we eliminated the MX, we could buy this many social programs or something; you know, this kind of an education program or whatever—and I think they are concerned about the strategic program. And I think we need to talk about it for a second, because as everyone here knows the authorization process that comes out of this committee puts a momentum in this defense budget that makes it increasingly difficult to control as years go on.

So programs we authorize today, we pay for tomorrow. And those programs we authorize today put some momentum in that defense budget that brings in the bills tomorrow, which gives us some inability to control spending. And everybody on this committee—Republicans and Democrats and conservatives and liberals—are concerned about what we are going to be doing with this defense budget over the next 3 to 5 years.

I want to point out that when you look at the strategic programs, as you look at the categories of putting the budget together here in the Armed Services Committee, you find that the strategic program accounts for about $28 billion of the defense budget, which is roughly $285 billion, but arrives somewhere in the vicinity of $300 billion. So we are spending about $28 billion total on the strategic program.

I hope that everyone will understand we are not talking about the strategic program comprising more than about 10 percent of the total defense budget of the United States. So when we are talking about B–1, when we are talking about Trident, when we are talking about MX, when we are talking about Midgetman, when we are talking about SDI, when you put them all together you are going a total of $28 billion today and $28 billion essentially over the period of the next 5 years.

If you are looking at areas with which to control this defense budget, I would maintain that the strategic area is not the area where you are going to get the most cost-effective savings. And, in fact, if you want to take a good look at it, in my judgment you have got to look at conventional systems.

I don't mean just to pick on one, but when you look at the fact that you have got a C–17 that is going to cost us about $4 billion in research before we even produce one, and almost about $40 billion when we start producing it—I use that system and bring that system up so that we get some comparison about what we are talking about, the whole total strategic program and one simple conventional system—but I would urge you to look at the RDT&E where that budget has gone up 100 percent over the period of the last 4 years; or if you look at support and command where we see a dramatic increase in vehicles, ship support, communication, replenishment spares, munitions, where there is a giant increase.

We know Senator Nunn in the Senate has made the argument that our European allies—Mr. Bennett, ought to do more in the munitions area—that we have a 30- or 40-day supply of ammunition. They have a 12-day supply. Yet, we will significantly boost the amount we spend in that area from about $12 billion to $20 billion

over the next 3 years. We look at the nonstrategic military area where there are dramatic increases.

So what I am saying to my colleagues is, if you want to address the question of cost, the MX itself represents about 1 percent of the total budget of the Pentagon; and second, the entire strategic program which the Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has decided needed to be modernized—that Trident, that B–1, now this MX missile, along with SDI, and what commitments we have made there, the total cost of that over the next 5 years is essentially going to be $28 billion. It remains stable.

So I think we shouldn't address it on the basis that this is the big cost savings program. Sure, we have got to be careful about this, but let's just not focus on this as being a panacea for controlling the defense budget because we defeat strategic modernization by doing it, No. 1.

And, No. 2, we are talking about something that represents literally 10 percent or less of the entire defense budget of the United States. And, therefore, I think that the program makes good sense from a cost standpoint, and from a strategic modernization aspect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to express my support.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You don't know which side I am on right now, and I didn't up until 1:45. To my colleagues, I would say I made a fatal political mistake. I voted against the MX missile last time and then had nerve enough to say that situations have changed a little bit. And I would certainly be amenable to changing my mind.

As all of you know, when you do that you get buffeted by both sides—not just one side. Certainly, it is better to take a position. But I thought this was so important, particularly in lieu of the arms negotiations talks in Geneva, that for the past 3 weeks I have searched.

I have been to the Defense Policy Panel so much that one of my colleagues said, "You are not going to be able to vote today." They thought I was a member of that panel.

I have been to the White House on three occasions, as late as yesterday. The President is a very convincing man.

Let me tell you this, to my colleagues: When you have a willing buyer—and I was a willing buyer—and you have a willing seller, and you can't make the sale, then something is wrong.

We talked in here about we have got to make a decision on MX. My 57 years of age tells me that something is wrong; that every year we go through this exercise. This is my third year of going through that—that something is wrong. You don't keep going through something like that.

I have the arguments—I would ask unanimous consent to submit this—I have the arguments that we have already heard today, so I am not going to bore you with those arguments. I am not convinced that the Soviet Union went to the negotiating table because of the

MX missile. You pull the defense bill out and you are looking at $300 billion. That is why they went to the negotiating table.

Now, I can paraphrase the politics and what has really happened in the politicizing of this thing. I believe in my President, I honestly believe. I believe that he believes in what he is doing.

I very seldom do this, but with your permission I am just going to read an excerpt from an editorial, Virginian Pilot, dated March 19, that will say it better than anything that I can say.

The complexities of nuclear strategy are not easily grasped. When the experts disagree, what is a Congressman to do when the President says in effect that failure to vote for the MX could lead to unproductive arms control talks? Few Congressmen want to be blamed for not doing all they should to slow the nuclear arms race toward Armageddon. If the President is wrong, the country is simply another $1½ billion out of pocket. If he is right, no proper arms agreement will be gained, and the arms race will roll on without check.

Who wants to be blamed for any costly collapse of arms bargaining? So the course many Congressmen will choose is to endorse another large expenditure for a weapons system without compelling substantive merit. They will vote for it as a symbol of resolve and as a bargaining chip.

If the arms talks fail, the fault will be the Russians' or the President's, and not theirs. But that won't expunge the reality that the MX is an unjustifiable extravagance.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, politically in the district that I come from, and with my admiration for the President of the United States, it would be very easy for me to say yes today. Only at 1:45 I reluctantly decided to vote "no." Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's statement will be put into the record without objection.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA

Since becoming a Member of Congress over 2 years ago, one of the most difficult decisions I have faced involves the production and deployment of MX missiles. I will be the first to say that I have decidedly mixed emotions about this program.

I have previously stated that I could not justify spending billions of dollars on a program that could not meet its primary objective. The primary objective of the MX missile program was to design a land-based ICBM that could survive a Soviet attack. Even proponents of the MX program readily admit that at least 89 percent of the force would be lost to a Soviet attack.

I have also stated that the MX is not an effective "bargaining chip" and is not among the primary reasons that the Soviets returned to the negotiating table at Geneva. I believe that the Soviets returned to the negotiating table because of across-the-board improvements in American military strength—improvements that I have vigorously supported.

In my opinion, the Soviets are much more concerned about American advances in the areas of antisatellite weaponry and the so-called "Star Wars" technology. I also believe that our continued production and deployment of Trident submarines has had a great impact on the Soviet decision to participate in arms limitation talks. And finally, I am confident that the Soviets were particularly concerned about the willingness of our allies to deploy cruise missiles in Europe.

The United States has made so many advances in so many areas of military technology that we can afford to say "No" to a particularly expensive system or to systems with questionable strategic value. We can afford to say "No" without jeopardizing our fundamental commitment to military strength and without in any way lessening our leverage with the Soviets in Geneva.

There are those who disagree with my position. The foremost of these is President Reagan. I talked with the President three times about this issue, most recently in the Oval Office. His arguments are persuasive, and I can assure you that I do not want to break ranks with my President—least of all on an issue of this magnitude and importance.

However, after more than two years of hearings, testimony, debate and study, I continue to believe that my original impressions of the MX missile were correct. The system is flawed, and these flaws reduce the value of the MX missile as a so-

called "bargaining chip." I think the President was wrong when he changed his mind about the program, switching from strident opposition to unqualified support.

I believe that the expense, the strategic flaws, and the destabilizing impact of this program continue to make it imperative that I draw the line between what is vital for national security and what is harmful to our interests both at home and in the international arena.

The Virginian-Pilot

Editorials

The MX 'support'

Rep. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has been swayed by President Reagan's insistence that the giant MX intercontinental ballistic missile is an essential bargaining chip in the U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations in Geneva. He intends to vote for 1985 funding for 21 more MX missiles, as the Senate Arms Services Committee did yesterday. That's regrettable, though understandable.

Much of the earlier opposition to the MX was based on the belief that President Reagan would never agree to arms-control talks. Now that U.S. and Soviet negotiators are actually sitting opposite one another in Geneva, objections to the missile have somewhat softened. When Mr. Reagan says the MX is necessary to a successful outcome of the talks, many congressmen are disposed to go along with him. (See Sen. John W. Warner's analysis on today's opposite-editorial page.)

LES ASPIN

Yet it is a curious turn of fortunes in the up-and-down career of the MX that, 14 years after the Pentagon began pushing for the missile to counter the Soviet buildup of gigantic land-based ICBMs, the best argument the White House offers for the thing is that it could be traded to make an arms-control deal. That bargaining chip, however, would cost the United States $1.5 billion this year, on top of $1 billion already being spent for parts procurement for the missile.

As a deterrent against a Soviet nuclear attack, the MX is no more than marginally superior to the aging Minuteman missiles it is designed to supplant. The MX would deliver bigger bangs for the buck, but so what? The first — and, indeed, the only credible — purpose of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter aggression that could lead to the firing of any nuclear weapons. That the second purpose of a nuclear force is to "win" a nuclear war if deterrence fails makes little sense; "winners" of a nuclear war would be indistinguishable from "losers."

In any event, the MX isn't necessary to upgrade the quality of the U.S. deterrent. The forthcoming D-5 ICBMs to be carried by the invulnerable Trident-submarine fleet will have greater range, a larger payload and accuracy previously peculiar to land-based ICBMs. The MX isn't needed for any strategic military purpose, particularly since the long-range plan for the land-based missile force calls for mobile, single-warhead Midgetman missiles that would be less vulnerable to destruction by incoming missiles than fixed-based Minuteman (or MX) missiles.

The complexities of nuclear strategy are not easily grasped, and when the experts disagree, what is a congressman to do when the president says, in effect, that failure to vote for the MX could lead to unproductive arms-control talks? Few congressmen want to be blamed for not doing all they should to slow the nuclear-arms race toward Armageddon. If the president is wrong, the country is simply another $1.5 billion out of pocket. If he is right, no proper arms agreement will be gained and the arms race will roll on without check. Who wants to be blamed for any costly collapse of arms bargaining?

So the course that many congressmen will choose is to endorse another large expenditure for a weapons system without compelling substantive merit. They will vote for it as a symbol of resolve and as a bargaining chip. If arms talks fail, the fault will be the Russians' or the president's, not theirs.

But that won't expunge the reality that the MX is an unjustifiable extravagance.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will not take all my time, but I wish to talk for a moment reflecting on some of the items that we have heard in the policy panel.

I think we should look at the world in which we live. We don't live in a fun world. It is a world that is frought with danger, particularly brought about by the Soviet Union, especially by what the Soviet Union has done. They have one thought in mind; we know what that is. We know also that their policy is when we build, they build; when we don't build, they build. We know as a result of our deterrence that we have been successful in keeping a military balance by having a strong strategic weapon such as this, or whether it be conventional.

Mr. Chairman, there have been three generations of Soviet missiles built, and we have built none. Mr. Chairman, the issue today is not whether we will build MX. The issue today is whether we will display the will of the American people and show them we will not allow them to continue unabated with the buildup they have so much done in recent decades.

I heard the defector, Mr. Shevchenko, speak here the other day. He said it would be a mistake to give them a unilateral position; it would be a mistake to give up anything. He said if anything, it would make them more difficult to get along with, because they think that through propaganda they can win in this situation, win the arms race. That is not what we are going to let them do.

Let's look at the world in which we live, sad as it is. We need to display, through this vote, the will of the American people that we intend to remain free. And this is one way we can do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daniel.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, I will only take 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California, Mr. Dellums, stated the case well a few moments ago when he said that there is nothing else that this committee can learn about the capability or unreliability of the MX system.

But I want to raise a question for those members on my side of the aisle, the Democrats. I hope no one will think this is frivolous or take it personally. I am very sincere when I ask the question.

If the House of Representatives—which is controlled by our party—denied this system to the President, which he says is vital, then how do we respond to the question—in addition to that, he elects to bring home the negotiators—then how do we respond to the question: Why did you pull the rug out from under the negotiators?

Mr. BENNETT. May I respond?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield some time?

Mr. DANIEL. I yield to Mr. Bennett, of course.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, of course the President can dramatize anything he wants to do about it. But there isn't any evidence that the President is going to the table because of this particular weapon. Everything we have heard is that the Russians have said repeatedly that they are not interested in the weapon one way or the other.

The President can say anything he wants to. He can say we are going to bring back the people from the table. He can embarrass

Members of the Congress who vote against this program. But we are not really involved with that.

I want to say one other thing. I think in the front of the first row of Members' seats it says in metal, as it also says in the Constitution, that the national defense of our country is provided by the Congress of the United States. For the 10 years which the U.S. Government had only the House of Representatives during the American Revolution, they ran it all. Then, when they came to making the Constitution and decided they would change that somewhat—but they still specifically left it in the Constitution—that the national defense of our country is provided for by the Congress of the United States.

The President is the Commander in Chief in time of war because of the fact that the revolution—they discovered that it was an awkward thing to have a militia—we do have a time problem here, so I will be glad to yield.

Mr. DANIEL. I want to yield to Mr. Dellums.

Mr. BENNETT. Then I will conclude my remarks by just saying it is the Congress that has the responsibility with regard to national defense. The President is the Commander in Chief, but he is only the Commander in Chief when we are in time of war. That is the only time he is.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding.

As I understand the question, if the Congress of the United States turned down this proposition, and the President, as a result of it, brought the negotiators back home from Geneva, what would be the response? I will give you a response.

Herblock drew a cartoon appearing in the Washington Post March 1 of this year. It says—two gentlemen conversing—"Don't get excited. We need the talks with the Russians as a bargaining chip to get Congress to OK the MX." If the President sent the negotiators home, it would simply underscore the statement that is so brilliantly made in this cartoon. That would simply mean that we were not at the bargaining table in very serious fashion.

The cruise missile is a very exotic technology. The issue of verification is very important. The deployment of the cruise missile in Europe, 10 minutes from them—they are very concerned.

The President bringing them home would be absurd.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Daniel, for yielding.

No. 1, I think if that action were taken it would be irresponsible on the part of the President, and the President is not irresponsible. He knows his responsibilities, and knows them very well.

I might ask a question, if I may. We are asking questions all day long.

What is to prevent the President from taking the same posture next year, as I stated before, and the year after and the year after, and therefore we are under the gun? I think what we have to determine today very clearly is, do we believe in the system or do we not? Then we have to vote our conscience.

Mr. DANIEL. I yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Carney.

Mr. CARNEY. I think the question we might have here is not so much whether the President would take back the negotiating team

as much as it might be what would the negotiating team have to do over in Geneva given a negative vote on the MX?

If we consider that the Soviets are, as my friend from Michigan said, now developing two mobile missiles, one under the guise of being the replacement for the SS-17, so they are allowed to do it under present protocol—that would be the 25, the single-warhead mobile missile—and the second one, the SS-24, which is a huge mobile system with 10 weapons on it, three times the size of our concept of Midgetman, they are doing that under the rule where they are allowed one new system.

Now they are going ahead with the development of these two weapons, and, I would assume, deployment of them. How do we get them to change their direction?

More importantly, however, we all agree, I believe, on this committee, we would like to look for a way to get to the Midgetman. Under the present protocol, that is prohibited. We have to negotiate the right to go out and deploy the Midgetman. How do we go about that if the Soviets have all these little tricks in their hat?

So the question is not will the President bring back the negotiating team. The question is, what do our negotiators have to deal with the Soviets in a straightforward and honest way? I think the answer to that is the MX missile. I would hope my colleagues would support the vote.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I see the hands of people who still want to talk about the issue?

All right. We will have Mr. Badham, Mr. Stump, Mr. Kramer, and then Tommy Robinson, and that is it. Go ahead.

Mr. BADHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I can be very brief.

We have heard from practically every Member of Congress on this subject. This morning's paper had John Glenn saying that the Midgetman was a cheap system; therefore, we ought to do that.

I don't know what our good friend and colleague from the other body, Mr. Glenn, has been studying. But the Midgetman hasn't been costed out yet, and that is going to be a one-warhead MX before anybody is through with it, which would be terribly expensive.

But I would like to suggest we are not talking about cartoons and caramels and diets and bargaining chips. We are talking about the defense of the United States of America, which this Congress is, by the Constitution, given the responsibility of. We will have critics of every weapon system, be it nuclear missiles, stationary, mobile, or whatever else. Every system that comes forward, we will have criticism of.

Interestingly, the MX is criticized today because of the vulnerability. The D-5 is criticized because it is not vulnerable; it is too survivable and therefore it is a bad weapon, because it is too survivable and therefore provocative.

MX is criticized as being a first strike weapon. With 100 missiles with a 1,000 warheads maximum, that can't put a sufficient dent in the Soviet Union's ICBM forces to anywhere near be considered a first strike weapon.

So I think it is time that this committee and this Congress face up to the idea that, yes, we must be concerned with what the Belgian public opinion is, and thank goodness they did what they did. We must be concerned with elections in England and the Federal Republic of Germany. We must do all we can to get the Soviets to the bargaining table, as we have, for a variety of reasons—not one single reason.

But the bottom line—and I hate to use that trite expression—is, does the United States of America need a new heavy missile system? And the answer, I think, from all the knowledge that this committee particularly has been given through technical experts and study and firsthand knowledge, is simply yes. And it is time we got about building that missile, because whether it is in a semi or less vulnerable hole, it is still a much better missile, the accuracy of which is unparalleled. And it is desperately needed for the defense of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stump.

Mr. STUMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have heard a lot about survivability and arms control. Let's think about deterrence for a minute.

The facts are, since we last deployed our Minuteman III, the Soviets have deployed four new systems. To sit here in the face of that, that massive modernization, and vote this program down would be the epitome of asininity.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kramer, the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, that puts me in a very difficult position. I am always reluctant to be the first speaker after a word such as that. I do that with some trepidation and anxiety.

I am going to reluctantly support the MX, primarily because it is the only game in town. There really is disparity between the Soviet force today and ours. They have hard target kill capability, first strike capability. We have nothing to offset that.

Quite frankly, while that disparity exists, it has got to create some temptation on the part of Soviet planners. I would echo perhaps a theme that has not been stated here yet this afternoon. That is, that it is my hope that this is really going to be the last decade in which this country does indeed build more and deploy more nuclear weapons.

Quite candidly, in my judgment arms control policies, as we have known them in the past, have been a dismal failure. While arms control conceptually is something very good, in practice it has been exactly the opposite. In fact, prior to SALT I, it is my recollection that the Soviets deployed about one new missile system a year for the preceding 17 years before 1972. Subsequent to SALT I, which was touted as in effect a nuclear freeze, the Soviets deployed 26 new or modified systems in just a little bit over 13 or 14 years—over a rate of 2½ a year, 2½ times what they did before SALT I.

I think that these arms control talks hold open the possibility of a new way of doing business, to use a new method of deterrence for our national strategy—one predicated not on the threat of offensive retaliation, massive offensive retaliation, as MX is and as Pershing and cruise and D–5 and all the others, but one based really on a true ability to defend ourselves—not by blowing up the other side

but by protecting ourselves against any attack, to the extent that we in effect make the existing methods of deterrence obsolete.

I think this is really indeed the promise of the strategic defense initiative. I think it holds open the promise where we literally, in the decade of the 1990's, will be able to substitute non-nuclear defensive systems for this terrible arsenal of offensive weaponry we have been building up since the dawn of the nuclear age.

I think the time has come for a new strategy. It is my hope that indeed we will not only live to see but hopefully still be members of this body when that new strategy is implemented, and we can build to unbuild this terrible destructive force that has been in motion now for over a quarter of a century.

I share the President's vision in his March 23 speech in 1983. It is far better to have a policy based on saving lives rather than avenging them.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The last speaker in the debate is Tommy Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It almost seems to me that this debate boils down to the far right conservatives saying that the Commies are coming, we must vote for the MX; and the far left liberals, they are saying we know the Commies are coming but let's wait until they cross the Canadian border. I say that because in the heat of the MX debate I think it is easy for us to lose sight of what this committee is here to do. That is, to offer this country a sound strategic defense policy that is both equitable and effective, and to support the President of the United States when he asks us for our help as Commander in Chief.

The MX missile, in my opinion, is necessary for us to carry out our duties and responsibilities, because over the last two decades the Soviet Union has deployed four new missiles, including 600 Peacekeeper type weapons already in silos, with 5,000 warheads, aimed at the United States; while the United States has not deployed a new ICBM since the Minuteman III in the early seventies.

The MX represents a long overdue modernization of the strategic triad. History has shown that the Soviets respect strength. After a thorough consideration, I believe that the production and deployment of the MX in Minuteman silos is required to enhance U.S. national security. It is consistent with our policy on arms control as well as the demonstrating to the Soviet Union that we are a nation that can stick together when our leader asks us for help in hopefully working toward world peace.

I want to close by saying this: As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the last couple of days I have been in the hospital with a few minor problems, including a fever. But my Arkansas fever is not near as bad as the Potomac fever and rhetoric I hear over the MX missile. I never thought I would crawl out of a hospital bed to help Ronald Reagan, because he came to my district 4 days before the general election and tried to beat me. But he is the President of the United States. He is the one that has to be responsible for making the decisions, whether or not we need the MX.

And I say that we need to vote for it; it is the right thing to do. Thank you.

Mr. DELLUMS. Would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir, I will yield.

By the way, Mr. Dellums is a friend of mine. Even though he is a liberal, we get along quite well.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I simply would like to respond as one of the people on the other side of this issue. I take issue with your comment that we are saying the Russians are coming. Indeed, we are arguing just the reverse.

What we are saying is that the Soviets are not coming because they know what we know; that we both have the capacity to destroy human life on the planet. Therein lies the reality that deterrence is a reality and that the MX missile does not add to that deterrence; it adds to the instability.

I simply want to set the record straight in terms of the other argument with respect to where we are vis-a-vis whether the Soviets are coming.

Mr. ROBINSON. I yield back the balance of my time for the vote.

The CHAIRMAN. All debate having ended, the vote now occurs on the motion of the gentleman from New York, Mr. Stratton.

All in favor say aye, opposed, no. The clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Aspin.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Price.
Mr. PRICE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Dickinson.
Mr. DICKINSON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Bennett.
Mr. BENNETT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Whitehurst.
Mr. WHITEHURST. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Stratton.
Mr. STRATTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nichols.
Mr. NICHOLS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mrs. Holt.
Mrs. HOLT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Daniel.
Mr. DANIEL. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hillis.
Mr. HILLIS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Badham.
Mr. BADHAM. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Dellums.
Mr. DELLUMS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Stump.
Mr. STUMP. Aye.
The CLERK. Mrs. Schroeder.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Courter.
Mr. COURTER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mrs. Byron.
Mrs. BYRON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hopkins.
Mr. HOPKINS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Mavroules.
Mr. MAVROULES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hutto.
Mr. HUTTO. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Kramer.
Mr. KRAMER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Leath.
Mr. LEATH. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hartnett.
Mr. HARTNETT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. McCurdy.
Mr. MCCURDY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Martin.
Mr. MARTIN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Foglietta.
Mr. FOGLIETTA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Kasich.
Mr. KASICH. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Dyson.
Mr. DYSON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Carney.
Mr. CARNEY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hertel.
Mr. HERTEL. No.
The CLERK. Mrs. Martin.
Mrs. MARTIN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mrs. Lloyd.
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Sweeney.
Mr. SWEENEY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Blaz.
Mr. BLAZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. SPRATT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Ortiz.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye by proxy.
The CLERK. Mr. Darden.
Mr. DARDEN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Robinson.
Mr. ROBINSON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Bustamante.
Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Aye.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye, was that, Mr. Bustamante?
Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Announce the vote.
The CLERK. Thirty-seven——
The CHAIRMAN. Hold it. Order of the committee.
The CLERK. Thirty-seven members voting in the affirmative; eight in the negative.
The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-seven voting in the affirmative; eight in the negative. The motion is carried.
Let me remind all members that on Monday there will be general debate on this issue on the House floor. Most of the 10 hours of debate will occur on Monday. They will save a couple of hours of debate, and the vote will be on Tuesday afternoon. General debate on Monday; Tuesday is the vote.
Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. DANIEL. The gentleman from Virginia would like to announce the Readiness Subcommittee will meet immediately upon adjournment of this committee in room 2212.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like also to remind anybody who would like additional views on this matter to please get them in today, because we have to file the report by midnight tonight.
Mr. COURTER. What time on Monday does the debate begin?
The CHAIRMAN. I think the House goes in at noon on Monday. We expect to run about 7 hours' debate on Monday, and maybe 3 hours and the vote on Tuesday afternoon.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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